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THE PHILOSOPHY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND
THE LIFE AND DEATH CASES
LINDA R. HIRSHMAN*
"Consume my heart away;
Sickened with desire and fastened to a dying animal."
W.B. Yeats: Sailing to Byzantium
On April 15, 1975, Karen Quinlan stopped breathing.'. At the time
of the trial on her father's petition for guardianship, she was comatose
and in a state medical experts call "vegetative." '2 As the court acknowl-
edged, "the quality of her feeling impulses is unknown."' 3 According to
the best evidence available at the time, she could "never be restored to
cognitive or sapient life."' 4 The situation arose, because medical technol-
ogy had progressed to the point where "you can in fact start to replace
anything outside of the brain to maintain something that is irreversibly
damaged."
Fifteen years later, in Cruzan v. Missouri the Supreme Court of the
United States issued its first decision on this compelling and controver-
sial issue.6 By a sharply divided vote (three justices in the opinion of the
court, with a majority formed by two concurring opinions, depending
most importantly on the tentative and moderating opinion of Justice
O'Connor), the Court ruled that the right to liberty in the Constitution
did not invalidate a state law requirement that an incompetent patient's
intent to be withdrawn from life support must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. 7 The Court stopped short of interpreting the Con-
stitution to be silent on the subject of the private right to die,8 and Justice
O'Connor's pivotal concurring opinion made explicit her support for
such a right, at least if embodied in a rigorously directive written docu-
* Professor of Law and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
Illinois Institute of Technology; B.A. 1966, Cornell University; J.D. 1969, University of Chicago;
Ph.D. Candidate, Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago.
1. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2. Her brain continued to function to generate blood pressure, heart rate, and even blinking
and reacting to light, but there were no signs of "cognitive or sapient" life. Id. at 655.
3. Id.
4. Id. (emphasis omitted).
5. Id at 652 n.2.
6. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2851 n.7. This hesitation was the subject of Justice Scalia's separate opinion, which
would rule out the constitutional claim altogether. Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ment, such as a living will.9
As the Quinlan opinion reflected, medical technology had come to a
point where one might expect a steady stream of such cases, and the
years between Quinlan in 1976 and Cruzan in 1990 were filled with
them. 10 Much has been written about these issues from the standpoint of
positive law and constitutional theory."1 I wish to examine the problem
and to use the compelling and revealing facts in some of the cases and
opinions, but this time through the metaphysical lens of various philoso-
phies of personal identity.
The main contemporary approaches to personal identity fall gener-
ally into three overlapping, but distinguishable, categories. The first
group emphasizes psychological connectedness as personal identity. 12
The discussions around this theory explore the ways in which the seem-
ing impermeability of the individual human identity is illusory; instead,
identity consists of the relationships among a brain, a body and a series
of events. Parfit fills in this theory with examples such as the split brain
patients13 and the fragility of identity over a human lifetime.14 I will
categorize this position, for historical and structural reasons, as a variant
of utilitarianism.' 5 The second category, which emphasizes the central-
ity of the separate individual will in personal identity, I will call Kant-
ian. ' 6 The third approach, which is most cogently set forth in the works
of Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, proposes that human identity
9. Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (collecting fifty-four reported
decisions), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
11. The legal periodical literature includes dozens of articles. Four pieces in the Harvard Law
Review alone reflect the diversity of possible approaches and the compelling nature of the problem:
The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitutional law; E. Right to Privacy, 104
HARV. L. REv. 247 (1990); Developments In the Law--Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1519 (1990); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right Of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1989); Nancy
K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375 (1988).
12. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). Parfit is the leading modern expositor of
the position that personal identity rests importantly in psychological connectedness and continuity.
13. Id. at 245. A set of twins is born, one brain dead. The remaining brain is divided between
the two. Which is the person?
14. Id. at 205. While a person today may be strongly connected to his psychological experience
yesterday, the same cannot be said usually for twenty years ago. Is Methuselah the same person he
was 800 years ago?
15. David Lewis, Survival and Identity; in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 17 (Amelie 0. Rorty
ed., 1976); John Perry, The Importance of Being Identical, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 67
(Amelie 0. Rorty ed., 1976); Derek Parfit, Lewis, Perry, and What Matters, in THE IDENTITIES OF
PERSONS (Amelie 0. Rorty ed., 1976).
16. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, Identification and Wholeheartedness, in THE IMPORTANCE OF
WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 159 (1988); Susan Wolf, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 46
(Ferdinand Shoeman ed., 1987). I have tentatively placed THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NO-




can be best understood in a mixture of connectedness and autonomy,
using metaphors of narrative and community frameworks for human
identity. 17
The Quinlan problem,18 which involves vegetative patients without
pain or cognitive life, compellingly presents the question of the identity
of persons, and it does so without invoking any of the science fiction
objections to the more far-fetched of the philosophical thought experi-
ments. 19 Conversely, insights from the philosophical learning should
help to illuminate the moral and legal questions posed by such patients. I
will use the cases, which involve patients without apparent pain, but with
ambiguous will regarding termination, as an experiment to exemplify the
strengths and weaknesses of the main schools of thought about personal
identity. I will try to probe the theories with two additional fact pat-
terns: first, I will imagine a hypothetical patient who cannot reason but
can experience pain, and who left an explicit previous directive not to
stay on life support machinery. Second, I will examine the situation of a
patient, with no reason and no sensations, but a compelling living will to
stay on life support.
Next, I will examine the extent to which the legal doctrine, particu-
larly as embedded in the two leading cases, Quinlan and Cruzan, is a
product of inadequately understood intuitions about personal identity-
intuitions which, lacking real analytic power, are clumsily producing
wrong answers. (The wrongness of the answers are nonetheless interest-
ing, for what they reveal about the assumptions and inadequacies of the
theories they manifest.) Finally, I will propose that the Quinlan cases can
be best handled by a variation of the narrative theories of personal iden-
tity. This solution does, however, entail the perverse consequence that
the legal system will have a much reduced role in deciding these matters.
17. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1989); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIR-
TUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981).
18. I will not adopt the terminology of the "right to die," which so powerfully incorporates
Kantian notions of rights and natural rights and individual natural rights as to blind the reader to
alternative paradigms. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 12:
To talk of universal, natural, or human rights is to connect respect for human life and
integrity with the notions of autonomy. It is to conceive people as active cooperators in
establishing and ensuring the respect which is due them. And this expresses a central fea-
ture of the modern Western moral outlook.
Similarly, I will call the subjects of consideration "patients," rather than the weighted "persons" or
"subjects."




I. THE ANSWERS AVAILABLE
A. The do/allow distinction
At the time of Karen Quinlan's coma, the positive law of the state of
New Jersey provided that "the unlawful killing of another human being
is criminal homicide." 20 In addition to the requested guardianship, Jo-
seph Quinlan asked that the local prosecutor be enjoined from prosecut-
ing him for this offense. Both his requests were opposed by the
prosecutor, the neurologist in charge, the hospital, the state, and the
court-appointed interim guardian of Karen Quinlan's person.2'
One possible way to resolve the issue was, of course, to invoke the
well-established distinction in morality and in criminal law between do-
ing and allowing. 22 This distinction has long supported, for example,
doctors' orders of DNR (do not resuscitate) in cases where painful and
imminently fatal disease is apparent before the life support machinery is
invoked.23 However, in Quinlan's case and many that have arisen since,
the testimony was unequivocal: "[N]o physician would have failed to
provide respirator support at the outset... 24 After that act, of course,
resort to the do/allow distinction would be difficult. Nonetheless, medi-
cal and legal authorities lingered for a while around the possibility of
categorizing life support as "extraordinary," such that even its with-
drawal could be classified as merely allowing the ordinary to occur, with
"doing" restricted to interfering with the ordinary course of nature.25
However, distinguishing between ordinary and extraordinary proved im-
practical, as various kinds of care form a continuum and depend on what
the authorities are seeking to accomplish in the particular case, which, in
turn, raises the ultimate question anyway. Moreover, a lot of cases sim-
ply involved feeding and liquids, which compellingly resemble the unas-
sailably ordinary.26 In such cases, there could be no resort to the fiction
that the patient died of the underlying cause. He or she would starve to
death. Thus, there could be no refuge in an easy rule like "you can al-
20. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669.
21. Id. at 653.
22. See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD
WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM, FOR AND AGAINST 77, 93-94 (1973).
23. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 657.
24. Id.
25. Kevin P. Quinn, S.J., Comment: The Best Interests of Incompetent Patients: The Capacity
for Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard for Decisionmaking, 76 CAL. L. REv. 897, 919-21
(1988).
26. Id. See also Quinlan, 355 A. 2d at 668. ("One would have to consider that the use of the
same respirator or life support could be considered 'ordinary' in the context of the possibly curable
patient but 'extraordinary' in the context of the forced sustaining by cardio-respiratory processes of
an irreversibly doomed patient.")
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ways disconnect a respirator. '27
Accordingly, the legal system has been compelled to confront-if
not to address in any systematic way-the fundamental issue of per-
sonhood. Actually, there are at least two legal issues packed together as
the cases come up. One is whether the patient is still a person, such that
the protections embodied in the criminal law should, or do, by definition
apply. The second is whether the patient's personhood is such that the
protections of life embodied in the criminal law should not apply, either
on its own terms or because different and preemptive legal protections of
personhood-for example, constitutional privacy doctrine-trump its ap-
plication. Each of these questions involves fundamental issues of per-
sonhood, which the philosophy of personal identity should at least
illuminate, if not answer.
B. The person as the human body, or part of it
One possible approach is to interpret the law broadly to protect all
human bodies. The New Jersey law in Quinlan, for instance, speaks of
"human beings," not persons.28 This approach can be divided at least
once again. One is that living human bodies are sufficient for per-
sonhood; thus the problem does not arise. This "vitalism," as it is called,
requires the protection of life at all costs. As many commentators have
noticed, if one adopts the vitalist position, one is committed to the preser-
vation for decades of "anencephalic infants, permanently unconscious,
with only cardiac, respiratory and excretory functions.
'29
Although vitalists certainly exist in the public square, most of the
serious discussion of the issues acknowledge that a living human body
like that of an anencephalic infant is not sufficient to ring in the concerns
the cases reflect.30 In part, this goes back to ancient philosophy, which
rested heavily on the distinctions between the functions of species. Like
all living things, people come in living bodies; the living body is not dis-
tinctive. But even philosophies like Kantianism, self-consciously re-
moved from the classical tradition, rest on some concept of human
uniqueness-in Kant's case the preeminence of the free will. Similarly, it
is some such category of qualities that distinguish persons from bodies,
even human bodies.
The second defense of a law extending to all human bodies is more
27. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2861 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669.
29. Nancy K. Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperilled Newborns: Why Quality of Life
Counts, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1317 (1985).
30. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 25, at 927 n. 169; Rhoden, supra note 29.
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prudential than definitional. Proponents would defend such an interpre-
tation on the ground, for example, of concern about the slippery slope, so
that mistakes about personhood do not wind up costing patients at the
margins their lives or so that indifference to survival doesn't lead to ne-
glect or assault on beings who are unassailably persons.31 Even setting
aside the positivist question of legal construction, both utilitarian and
Kantianism analyses may be invoked to support the overprotection of
life; utilitarianism as a rule of thumb, because of the difficulty of judging
in a particular case, 32 and Kantianism because even suicide on grounds
of future pain or loss is immoral as unimaginable under a law of nature.
33
Although it would obviate the need for an understanding of per-
sonhood in the context of these cases at the positivist level, prudential
vitalism cannot legitimate such laws, because this argument still leaves
unanswered an important part of the philosophical question of whether
there is something about humans that makes them worth overprotecting.
If there is some such thing, and if, in the Quinlan state, that "thing" is
not perfectly congruent with the body, the argument for protecting the
human body as a condition precedent for personhood is simply reduced
to a risk assessment.
34
In modern philosophy, the thought experiments about organ trans-
plants generate the strong intuition that not only is the body not suffi-
cient, but all of the body is not even necessary for personhood. 35 Insofar
as any body part is necessary, the strongest intuition is for that part of
the body which is the brain,36 because it is difficult to imagine surviving a
whole human brain transplant with one's personhood intact.
But one can go further with the thought experiments and contem-
plate the possibility that even the whole brain isn't necessary to per-
sonhood, as in, for example, surgery that affects one's right-handedness
31. Quinn, supra note 25, at n.37 and 927-8 (citing sources).
32. J.J.C. SMART, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART & BARNARD
WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM, FOR AND AGAINST 3, 42 (1976).
33. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR A METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 422 (H.J. Paton
trans., 1964). Upon closer examination, the Kantian argument turns out to be prudential as well.
This is so because the impossibility of loss minimizing suicide is extremely questionable, unless one
envisions such suicide as weakening some sort of separate life force. Otherwise, such suicide may
keep the population down, but it doesn't wipe it out.
34. Here, the facts in the actual case are instructive: "She can never be restored to cognitive or
sapient life." Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655 (emphasis omitted). At that level of improbability, gambling
on medical miracles would essentially collapse into the slippery slope argument.
35. If human bodies were necessary and sufficient for personhood, the whole field of personal
identity would be reduced. One might interestingly address questions of burial for fingernail clip-
pings, etc., but issues of identity over time, multiple personalities, consciousness, and self-creation
would all be avoided.
36. NAGEL, supra note 16, at 28.
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or some such function, or even that which produces mild aphasia. In-
deed, Quinlan and the others are only dead as to the sapient and cogni-
tive functions. Their brains are still able to maintain vegetative functions.
The answer here might be that a person is some minimum of the thinking
aspects of the higher brain, allocating the vegetative functions to the
body, as described above. Under this analysis, a person might be more
than the thinking brain, but it certainly no less. If a person is minimally
the thinking brain, patients like Quinlan would not be covered by the
homicide statute, and these difficult-seeming cases would be easy.
37
We can test this intuition by asking whether there is any circum-
stance or any theoretical construct which would cause us to hesitate to
disconnect someone in Quinlan's position-a body, but not a thinking
brain-from artificial life-support systems. Here, I think, the two
thought experiments may do some work: one, if the patient were to expe-
rience profound physical pain upon dying, despite being unable to think
or reason about it; second, if the patient, while facing no pain, had ex-
pressed when conscious a strong commitment to living as long as tech-
nology allowed, say, for example, in hope of new medical developments.
Although these cases may not, in the end, be decided differently under
theories other than the thinking brain theory, the hesitation at pulling
the plug in either hypothetical case should at least cause us to doubt the
strength of this, simplest, answer. What do the other theories say about
these and the actual cases?
C Utilitarianism and utilitarian theories of personal identity
Utilitarianism, with its teleological and hedomic underpinnings, pro-
tects physical well-being to the extent not outweighed by competing well-
being. Thus, for example, many utilitarians have in recent years come to
varying positions of vegetarianism, based on the capacity of other species
to feel pain. 38 One might infer, therefore, that utilitarians would support
application of the criminal law to protect patients in the position of
Karen Quinlan, on grounds of their possession of a body with a capacity
to suffer at death and on their loss of future pleasures.
But the protections of utilitarianism, though broad, are not deep.
Thus, Quinlan's speculative pain would be discounted by her lack of re-
sponse to painful stimuli and the absence of hope of future pleasure; the
possibility of her future suffering and the suffering of her family and
37. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 656 (citing Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, 205 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 337, 339 (1968)).
38. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975).
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others implicated in her status would weigh against her continued life in
the utilitarian calculus.
39
Of course the patient's naturally anesthetized state makes this a
much easier case for utilitarianism; one would anticipate a much harder
calculus in the case set forth above of a speechless, non-cognitive, but
unassailably physically sensible human. 40 One utilitarian approach would
simply be to balance the pain to others against the pain to the subject.
Wealth-maximizing variants of utilitarianism might justify disconnection
here, if only one could be sure of the patient's own will was to be cut off,
and that is the most accurate measurement of the relative pain and plea-
sure.41 This approach has the additional appeal of reassuring people that
commitments to them will be kept, invoking the social peace of mind
argument.
42
The hard problem for the utilitarian approach is, of course, the veg-
etative patient who will not suffer but who had expressed a desire not to
be disconnected. Here, again, one move available to utilitarian theories of
personhood might be that people would not be disconnected against their
previous wishes under utilitarianism, because people would suffer pain
anticipating that their wishes at death would not be honored. Critics of
utilitarianism might make the countermove of weighing more heavily the
costs of maintaining the patient against the generalized anxiety of future
hemlock.
These hedonic arguments pretty much come to deadlock on the
measuring problem, but the more complex and subtler utilitarian ap-
proach to personal identity articulated by Derek Parfit does weigh in on
the side of terminating the pro-life vegetative patient, in part by removing
the arguments of the wealth-maximizers. This is so because, according to
Parfit, if utilitarianism must weigh personhood beyond the body and if
personhood is linked somehow to consciousness, people evolve over their
lives, until the person at any given time is but remotely, if at all, related
to the possessor of experiences that was the past self.43 This is most
graphically illustrated by the example of people aging and losing the
memories they had of their own past lives; who alive thinks of himself or
39. For a thorough review of the direct utilitarian analysis, see James Lindgren, Death by De-
fault, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (forthcoming 1993).
40. The possibility of compelling claims to disconnect even in this scenario is, of course, what
supports the criticism of utilitarianism as producing "utility monsters," but this is well beyond the
scope of this paper.
41. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 107 (1981); Lindgren, supra note 39
(manuscript at 15 n.76).
42. SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 62.
43. PARFIT, supra note 12, at 281.
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herself as the same "person" at age five or fifteen? Moreover, although
Quinlan and the hypothetical patients were persons in the past, by any
calculation, their present selves are but distantly related to the past
selves-indeed, they may be at the other side of an abrupt break in the
self at the time of their loss of consciousness-and any claims they might
have must be measured in terms of their present reduced selves, not as
the sum of their past lives and desires." Accordingly, the degree of pain
associated with the ignorance of a person's wishes regarding this future
self should be quite small. Thus, utilitarian theories of personal identity
seem to favor disconnecting the patient.
This outcome graphically illustrates the connection between utilita-
rian metaphysics and ethics. By deconstructing the person into a series
of psychological relationships of continuity (and, as illustrated above,
change), Parfit's utilitarian metaphysics lighten the weight of the
bounded human individual on the ethical scale at any given time. The
life and death cases show how the claims of other "persons" like family
members and co-citizens then gain relative to the claims of the
individual.
Utilitarianism, is one of the mainstays of the American systems of
tort and criminal law.45 It is no surprise, then, that "[n]early unani-
mously, ... courts have found a way to allow persons wishing to die, or
those who seek the death of a ward, to meet the end sought."
46
Yet, the various court opinions contain nothing like the bald utilita-
rian analysis. There are two potential explanations for this. First, the
courts may be lying about what they are doing, because the reality is too
threatening to the public moral order.47 There is some implication of this
in the persistent concern with the slippery slope in both its incarnations,
mistake and indifference. 48 In the alternative, the courts may be strug-
44. Parfit regards this as reason to be sanguine in face of death. After one's death, someone or
several ones will have pieces of memory of one's passage across life; they will be different in degree,
rather than in kind, from the self who would survive the replacement of consciousness over years
absent death. Id.
45. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER: THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 357 (1st ed. 1972); Paul
H. Rubin, The Economics of Crime, 28 ATLANTA ECON. REV. 38, 41 (1978); George J. Stigler, The
Optimum Enforcement Of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).
46. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 413.
47. This surfaces whenever discussion of medical triage does. Richard Posner's economic anal-
ysis of law, which articulates more frankly than most the efficiency calculations about human life
behind, for example, tort law, is often criticized for its cold-bloodedness. Lynne Henderson, Authori-
tarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379 (1991); Richard H. Weisberg, Entering With a
Vengeance: Posner on Law and Literature, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (1989); James B. White, What
Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989); Robin West, Submission,
Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1986).
48. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854 ("An erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
1992]
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gling to articulate an underlying normative commitment, which may
produce utilitarian results, but which they believe is more compatible
with underlying public moral/political commitments. 49 Since judicial
opinions are one way in which social norms are articulated and ad-
vanced, an analysis that neglects judicial rhetoric loses a critical aspect of
the available material. 50 Moreover, some of the bizarre developments in
the evolving legal doctrine can be understood as an unarticulated tug of
war between these competing claims on the decision-makers, which are
imperfectly understood both at their cores and in their points of conflict
and congruence.
D. Autonomy theories of personhood
Most of the opinions in the Quinlan cases articulate a norm of the
preeminence of the separate individual, exercising conscious, autono-
mous will. The reasoning goes as follows:
1. A competent, terminally ill patient would be legally protected in a
decision to cease life support.
2. There is no basis for discriminating against an incompetent patient
in obtaining the same result.
3. Therefore, the only question is in ascertaining "whether she would
exercise [her right] in these circumstances." 51
In step one of the analysis, the conscious will is deciding to cause the
death of the body, including the sapient and cognitive regions of the
brain. In honoring that decision, where the legal system would not honor
a similar decision simply made by another-for economic reasons-for
instance, the legal system tacitly recognizes some superior claim of the
conscious will. In Quinlan, this conclusion is buttressed by the Court's
placement of the right in the penumbra of the Bill- of Rights, which
evolved under the rubric the "right to privacy."' 52 From its origins in the
not unrelated notions of solitude and secrecy,5 3 privacy was early and has
recently been revived as protecting "personality, ' 54 in the sense of a
... is not susceptible of correction."); and id. at 2859 (Scalia, J. concurring) ("the point at which life
becomes 'worthless' and the point at which the means necessary to preserve it become 'extraordi-
nary' or 'inappropriate' are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of
this Court...").
49. This idea, and the norm to which the opinions seem so wedded, comes from Kim Schep-
pele's study of the common law of legal secrets. KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS (1988).
50. Id. at 98-108.
51. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
52. Id. at 663.
53. Samuel D. Warren & Louise D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890); SCHEPPELE, supra note 49, at 185 n.28.
54. Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV.
L. REV. 640, 668-76 (1916), cited in Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 662 n.7.
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sphere of freedom for individual decision-making adequate to allow a
human to develop and enjoy personhood.5 5 Not surprisingly, the sub-
jects of choice are clustered closely around the body, the other major
contender for the carrier of bounded, individualist personhood. The
other privacy decisions include such issues as whether or not to be steril-
ized, 56 whether to bear or beget a child,57 certain gross bodily inva-
sions, 58 and how to educate one's children.5 9
Several things flow from this linkage of personhood to the exercise
of conscious choice as demonstrated at the time of decision to disconnect.
One might reason that, absent such a capacity or the hope of ever recov-
ering the capacity, patients like Karen Quinlan have ceased to be per-
sons, and, although her death should not be compelled, it may be allowed
despite the criminal law, as if she were an animal, indeed, less than an
animal, because she lacked even the utilitarian claim to feel pain. Thus,
in this particular case, the autonomy formulation would support a utilita-
rian result. But the thought experiment of the non-cognitive patient, with
the express desire to stay on life support, illustrates that strictly constru-
ing personhood as the capacity for present conscious choice might allow
ignoring the past expressions of choice, which, in turn, depends on weak-
ening the claim to continuity of personhood over time. This exercise thus
reveals interestingly the importance to the choice/autonomy theories of
the temporal continuity that Parfit attacks.
One might come to a different result, however, without resolving the
temporal identity debate, by arguing that the choice theory of per-
sonhood allows for the primacy of the capacity for conscious choice in
defining personhood, but not its hegemony. It would follow, therefore,
that only a conscious choice can operate to terminate the body's life.
Unless such a choice is made when possible, the accidental loss of higher
choice functions would not suffice to allow disconnection. This primacy
formulation is more consistent with the retreat from mind/body dualism
in modern philosophy of personal identity.6° This is so, because the deci-
sion under this formulation to cut off life support would indeed be self-
inflicted death, involving without distinction both the mind, and the
55. Linda R. Hirshman, Bmnt Bloom & Boric An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 177, 217-24 (1988) (abortion as essential to autonomy necessary for citizenship);
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. Rnv. 737, 782-802 (1989) (sexual preference as
similarly essential to personhood).
56. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
57. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
59. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
(1925).
60. NAGEL; supra note 16, at 28-29.
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brain, representing the body (assuming the mind and body are at least
minimally distinct), operating without distinction at the time of the deci-
sion.61 However, once ascertained, the primacy of conscious choice
would dictate-not merely allow-following the choice to discontinue
life support, because it would tie into personhood as a constitutional
trump. Within this second formulation, the system would pursue evi-
dence of the patient's choice, and what factors are allowed to play a role
would reflect more aspects of the kind of choice thus powerfully linked
with personhood.
62
Under the respect for conscious choice formulation, the presence or
absence of pain in the first problem case should be of no moment in the
decision. Given adequately explicit choice, the patient should be discon-
nected. Thus, both autonomy formulations produce the same result in
this instance; the problems with the outcome lie in the willingness to
participate in the infliction of pain in the interest of autonomy and the
willingness to bear social costs in the form of hardening of the sensibili-
ties about such an act. 63 On the other hand, contrary to the hegemony of
autonomy formulation, under the primacy of autonomy theory, the pa-
tient with the explicit instruction not to disconnect would be maintained.
As set forth above, the cases have not involved a substantial likeli-
hood of pain associated with termination of life support. Interestingly,
none of the cases has involved an express will to stay on life support,
either, although last year the media reported a case where a spouse was
claiming to know the patient's will to do so.64 The hardest cases the
system has had to face are what to do with silence or ambiguity regard-
ing the patient's desires. But the above exercise of considering those cases
has revealed some of the stress points in both of the formulations: the
utilitarian producing problematical results in the case of ignoring the ex-
plicit directive to maintain at all costs, and the autonomy formulation
producing similarly problematical results in the case of participating in
the willed painful death.
61. Id.
62. Interestingly, Sartre's theory of personal identity, involving the possibility of radical refor-
mulation of self at any time, fits either outcome (he should like that). Under Sartre's formulation, no
past indication of will should be informative of what the incompetent patient would do. Donald
Beschle has articulated this insight at greater length. Donald L. Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmak-
ing and Social Choice: Examining the "Right to Die," 77 Ky. L. J. 319, 344 (1989). On the other
hand, lacking the capacity to reformulate one's self radically ever again, Sartre might consider the
person already dead. Finally, since being includes nothingness, maybe someone in a persistent vege-
tative state is a complete person under Sartre's theory.
63. This is the argument against the death penalty, for instance.
64. Judy Mann, When The Hospital Sues to Pull the Plug, WASH. PosT, May 31, 1991, at 83.




As set forth above, since the landmark decision in the Quinlan case
finding a "right to die" in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, the Ameri-
can legal system has, by and large, articulated the primacy of autono-
mous choice analysis, purporting to scan the record of the patient's past
life for indications of what he or she would do at present. 65 Legislatures
followed suit, enacting statutes allowing the execution of a living will,
which dictates or restricts allowable treatment in various contingencies. 6
6
Several states also legislated authority for a durable power of attorney,
designating a person to make such decisions in the event of
incompetency.
67
In this context, it is interesting to note that the plurality opinion in
Cruzan explicitly refuses to endorse the concept of a "right of privacy,"
68
choosing to call the constitutional protection (if any) "liberty."' 69 In the
trench warfare over the meaning of the Bill of Rights, particularly the
"penumbral" protections that have evolved over the rubric of privacy,
"liberty" stands for a thin protection, little greater than physical freedom
and self-determination,70 and, unlike the concept of privacy, not nearly
as dependent for its meaning on the necessary appurtenances of full per-
sonhood. As thus articulated, the "liberty" concept may stretch to a nar-
row understanding of conscious choice, but it certainly is no greater.
In any case, even these apparent commitments to honoring the indi-
vidual's will fall short of an ideal of pure personal choice. First, any such
effort suffers from the epistemological problem of knowing from past be-
havior what the person's present wishes are. Under either the existential
or the utilitarian theories of personal identity, even the most compelling
living will or well-established statement of intent may be seen as seeking
to bind a self only problematically related to the speaker. 7' But, more
interestingly, the legal system, whether the legislature or the courts,
whether state common law courts or federal courts interpreting the U.S.
Constitution, has consistently put its finger on the scale when allegedly
attempting to ascertain the free choice of its autonomous subjects.
65. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 (family and physicians to decide what patient would wish); see
also In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
66. See, e.g., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (collecting statutes).
67. Id. at 2858 n.3 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 2851 at n.7.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, in contrast to the rich description of "choices
constitutive of private life" in the cases cited by the dissenters, id. at 2884, Justice O'Connor invokes
only cases of direct bodily intrusion (forced feeding, stomach-pumping). Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
71. PARFrr, supra note 12, at 302-06.
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Thus, some living will statutes are heavily restricted, for instance, to
cases of incompetents facing fatal illnesses, rather than embracing all in-
stances of incompetency, or, in another instance, forbidding the testator
to refuse nourishment and hydration. 72 In other cases, the courts have
imposed rigorous standards of proof of intent not to sustain life, making
it difficult, if not impossible, to prove.73 Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
making the necessary majority of five votes for affirmance of the restric-
tive standard, indicated constitutional support, but only for explicitly
written instructions like those contained in the living will and power of
attorney statutes. 74 Few people have the forethought and discipline to
take advantage of them.75
There are many explanations for these restrictions. The system may
fear that people seeking to disconnect the patient are dishonest or self-
serving. But there are safeguards such as requiring a sort of devil's advo-
cate guardian ad litem 76 or excluding unsupervised nursing home pa-
tients to avoid such problems. 77 There was no implication of any such
issue in Cruzan, and many of the restrictive statutes apply without regard
to the patients' particular situations.
The system may fear that ascertaining the patient's prospects is un-
certain, and mistakes may kill patients who did have the capacity to re-
turn to sentient life. But the restrictions do not speak to medical
uncertainty. They apply to manifestations of the choice regardless of the
certainty of hope of recovery.
Some limitations on the acceptable manifestation of choice in the
critical area of bodily death are understandable as a reflection of the dis-
tinction between honoring conscious choice of first order desires and the
desires of persons with the desire to have certain kinds of desires, that is,
persons with at least one level of distance on their impulses.78 Put an-
72. This is the Missouri statute involved in Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2870 n.15 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Clearly, Nancy Cruzan had not executed such a statutory document. As construed in
Cruzan, the statute did not preempt the field of termination of life support, technically allowing
room for the debate described above and below over whether Cruzan could be disconnected anyway.
It is important to note, however, that, as set forth below, the outcome after remand allowing discon-
nection is obviously inconsistent with the explicit terms of the statute; accordingly, the facts in
Cruzan's case support the thesis that something fishy is going on. See infra text accompanying note
89.
73. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857; Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (clear and convincing evidence of pa-
tient's intent or demanding "objective test" applies).
74. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct., at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) at 2875 n.21.
76. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d 417 (Mass.
1977) (this would be a person assigned the job of making the best case for maintenance).
77. Conroy, 486 A. 2d at 1240.
78. Frankfurt, supra note 16, at 162-64.
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other way, the claim for the primacy of choice in personhood such that
the conscious choice may dictate death is a claim for a kind of choice
itself reflective of personhood. This is the choice of a creature with at
least one level of check on its impulses, with all that implies: the con-
sciousness of self, the time to consider what kind of self to be, and the
claims in such a decision of, for example, consistency over some or all of
life. The language in the key decisions, of "firm and settled commit-
ment, '" 79 fits with this philosophical notion of the person as a self-
reviewer.
But even this sophisticated version of the person does not encom-
pass all of the issues in the cases. As set forth above, although most states
do not prosecute for suicide regardless of the state of the victim's
health,80 and, although the right to refuse medical treatment when com-
petent is theoretically unlimited,8' no such open-ended choice is honored
in the cases of incompetent patients. In many jurisdictions, the limita-
tions are quite severe. Thus, although the opinions eschew utilitarian lan-
guage, both the opinions and the statutory schemes stop well short of
embracing autonomy either.
Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, commentators of the com-
munitarian persuasion, have suggested that the difficulty of squeezing the
decision about death into the pure autonomy model or the utilitarian
balancing model reflects the impoverishment of any such theories to ex-
plain personal identity.8 2 Instead, they suggest, any theory must recog-
nize the critical factor in personhood of relationships to other people.
One writer of this school suggests an objective standard to deter-
mine when people are no longer eligible for life support based on whether
they are capable of human relationships, however minimal. 83 This formu-
lation suffers from the same structural defect as the utilitarian and auton-
omy theories: all would decide this important issue with the broadest of
brushes-a concept of abstract rights or attributes applicable to any liv-
ing human. Such concepts are necessary in certain unavoidably rule-
based systems, but they suffer from too thin a concept of the human be-
ing,8 4 and, as the facts of the Quinlan cases and the two thought experi-
79. See, e.g., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855 n.11.
80. George P. Smith, II, All's Well That Ends Well, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 283 (1989);
Cruzan 110 S. Ct., at 2860 (Scalia, J, concurring).
81. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct., at 2851, 2852; Id. at 2865-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reviewing
decisions).
82. See Linda C. Fentiman, Prtivacy and Personhood Revisited: A New Framework for Substitute
Decisionmaking for the Incurably Ill Adult, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 840-41 (1989); Quinn,
supra note 25, at 917-26.
83. Quinn, supra note 25, at 926-36.
84. See, e.g., CHARLES A. TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 91-107 (1989). "A series of dis-
1992)
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ments suggest, such concepts are also too inflexible for questions of such
complexity and richness as when to cut off life support.
III. THE NARRATIVE SOLUTION
Not surprisingly, people's behaviors are enacting a rebellious scena-
rio, generating data which a system in a free society cannot forever ig-
nore: people are acting inconsistently with explicit social rules.85 As
Missouri Supreme Court Justice Blackmar noted, dissenting from his
court's approval of the restrictions in Cruzan, when the responsible per-
sons in a Quinlan case want to disconnect their "ward," they will find a
way to do So.
8 6
The ways they have found are enlightening. In the Quinlan case, the
New Jersey Court, having explicitly found that it was impossible to as-
certain Karen Quinlan's will from the record,8 7 left it to her family and
guardian to determine what she would have done.8 8 In the Cruzan mat-
ter, after the Supreme Court of the United States put its imprimatur on
the state selection of a very tough standard of proof, the lower court
found that Cruzan's informal statements to two other friends were ade-
quate. The lower court obtained this result even though the statements
did not remotely approach the level of reliability required by the Mis-
souri living will statute, and the act-disconnecting food and water-was
expressly excluded from allowable options had the statute been used.8 9
Most revealing, however, is the dirty little secret that many people die by
having their life support systems disconnected without any living will,
power of attorney, or court order.90 What's going on?
Professor Fentiman has captured the structural part of the issue, in
suggesting that the system must admit forthrightly that the decision is
out of the hands of the individual and must be made in a dialogue within
the patient's community-doctors, family, and, if necessary, institutional
putes of this form runs through modem culture, between what appear to be the demands of reason
and disengaged freedom, and equality and universality, on one hand, and the demands of nature, or
fulfillment, or expressive integrity, or intimacy, or particularity, on the other." Id. at 101.
85. See, e.g., Rorie Sherman, Bioethics Debate; Americans Polled on Bioethics, NAT'L L.J., May
13, 1991, at 1; Robert Steinbrook, Support Grows for Euthanasia, L.A. TIMES, April 19, 1991, at Al;
ANDREW H. MALCOLM, SOMEDAY (1991). See Lindgren, supra note 39 (polls inconsistent with
legal rules).
86. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 412 n.33.
87. 366 A.2d at 653 ("such statements ... were remote and impersonal, lacked significant
probative weight").
88. Id. at 664.
89. Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate over the Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1990, at Al (The probate court decision appears to be unreported.).




The problem is that, although Fentiman's formulation is flexible,
like much of dialogism, it stops short of giving guidance to the decision-
makers.92 I suggest that juries, trial courts, families, hospital staff, and
doctors are manifesting the reality of a different theory of personhood:
that people are "self-creating animals," whose personhood is captured in
stories, or what Charles Taylor calls "the kinds of narratives in which we
make sense of our lives." 93 What the cases reflect, however, is that peo-
ples' story lives are not in the mode of new criticism, 94 where the critic is
forbidden to go outside the text for understanding. In limiting the in-
quiry into personal identity by the canons of the New Criticism, one
might treat as the text the person's internal story, as manifested in any
unassailable circumstantial evidence of what that internal story was. It is
interesting to note that even this relatively impoverished version of narra-
tive identity is capable of substantially more richness of resources than
the narrow search generated by the autonomy formulation, looking only
for the person's will regarding disconnection from life support
technology.
I suggest that the philosophy of narrative identity should function
more in the way modern deconstructionists see the story. The person
writes his or her story for herself, with all the associated charged memo-
ries and self-deception and selective remembering that the story theorists
of personal identity articulate. 95 What is different is that, as the cases and
thought experiments illustrate, the text of personhood can never belong
entirely to the author. As soon as it leaves his or her pen, it falls into the
hands of others. Indeed, the very materials from which the story is writ-
ten-personal history, community background, and the literary materials
of self-creation (what Harold Bloom calls the "anxiety of influence" 96)-
are extrinsic.97 But when the person has used her materials to their ful-
91. Fentiman, supra note 82, at 840-48.
92. See, Hirshman, supra note 55; Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American
Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REV. 983 (1990) (for the weaknesses of dialogism).
93. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 102.
94. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 46, 53 (1983); see also RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 218-19 (1988).
95. 1 MARCEL PROUST, THE REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST 48-49 (C. Moncrieff & T.
Kilmartin trans., 1981) (the Madeleine scene).
96. HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE 6 (1973).
97. See generally HAROLD BLOOM, ET AL., DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM (1979); see also
TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 103, 106; MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 106:
[I]t is central to the notion of a setting as I am going to understand it that a setting has a
history, a history within which the histories of individual agents not only are, but have to
be, situated, just because without the setting and its changes through time the history of the
individual agent and his changes through time will be unintelligible.
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lest and written as much as she can and lies unconscious and sustained
by mechanical support, the readers of her life unassisted will write the
last act-the deathbed scene, if you will. They can try to reproduce the
ending the individual would have written for herself, but the intractabil-
ity of ascertaining the authorial intent outlined above (and the artificial-
ity of separating that intent from the other elements of the story) reflects
the inadequacy of radically individualistic formulations to answer ques-
tions of such biological and temporal imprecision as personhood.
What people are doing-around the rigid structures required by a
legal system-is a kind of middle ground. By allotting the decision to the
people close enough and close for long enough to the patient to have
played a role in the ongoing story of her personhood, they are reproduc-
ing as faithfully as possible in the last scene the elements of a person's life
story: the authors will know her and be constrained by what they know
of her autobiography; this is the difference between the story theory and
the pure community dialogue solution set forth above. 98
Yet the authors will represent the intractability of the social aspects
of personhood, including the imprecise, indeed, often erroneous, under-
standings of the person they are writing. The last act will also include the
role the patient plays in the authors' own narratives in progress, includ-
ing the authors' utilitarian balancing of their interests and the patient's,
interests as perceived along with claims of guilt on the authors and the
authors' own capacity to envision a world without the patient.
The last act-a kind of Kantian pension-involving fulfillment of
the contributions the person made in writing her life story while able, as
well as the capacity of the persons who participated with her in the enter-
prise to understand and pay her off-will thus reflect the linearity as well
as the commonality and, ultimately, the unavoidable dependency of per-
sons on one another.
98. See supra notes 92-93.
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